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THE EFFECTS OF THE INCREASE IN PARENTAL LEAVE BENEFITS ON WAGES 
Bárbara Alexandrino 
 
Abstract: This study uses 2007-2012 data from Quadros de Pessoal and a difference-
in-differences methodology to analyze the effects of the increase in parental leave 
benefits introduced in 2009 by the revision of the Labor Code and Decree-Law 91/2009. 
Results show a persistent statistically significant negative effect of the policy, pointing 
to a 3.6% reduction of the hourly wages for the individuals targeted by the legislation. 
There is evidence of a larger effect for individuals with more qualifications, as well as 
for those with more years of schooling. Findings are consistent with the model of 
mandated benefits, as the increase in employer costs is shifted to wages. Results are 
robust to the use of different specifications of periods and groups. 
JEL Classification: J3, J13, J18 
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Bárbara Alexandrino 
 
Resumo: O presente estudo utiliza a base de dados Quadros de Pessoal de 2007 a 2012 
e a metodologia de diferenças-em-diferenças para a análise dos efeitos do aumento dos 
benefícios de licença parental introduzidos em 2009, através da revisão do Código de 
Trabalho e do Decreto-Lei 91/2009. Os resultados exibem um efeito negativo 
estatisticamente significativo da medida estabelecida, indicando uma redução de 3,6% 
da remuneração horária para os trabalhadores-alvo da alteração. Existem evidências de 
maiores efeitos para indivíduos com maiores qualificações, bem como para indivíduos 
com maior grau de habilitações. Estes resultados encontram-se em conformidade com 
os modelos teóricos de benefícios obrigatórios estipulados, onde o aumento do custo 
para o empregador é transferido para a remuneração do trabalhador. A robustez dos 
resultados foi testada com recurso a diferentes especificações de períodos e grupos.   
Classificação JEL: J3, J13, J18 
Palavras-Chave: licença parental, benefícios parentais, salários
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This study aims to explore the labor market effects of the introduction of a new 
legal framework regarding parental leave in Portugal in 2009. More specifically, it is 
intended to assess how the increase in benefits through this change in legislation has 
affected wages.  
The relevance of parental leave as a social policy tool is undeniable as the effects 
are transversal to several areas – health, fertility and the labor market. With the increase 
in women’s participation in the labor market during the last century, combined with the 
marked decrease in fertility in this century, it is not surprising every country provides 
some type of arrangement for maternity protection, and, in recent years, arrangements 
have increasingly been made for fathers, as well. 
Maternity leave, i.e. the permitted absence of women from employment around the 
time of childbirth, stems from social and economic changes in the 20th century, having 
been recommended by the International Labor Organization since 1919 (Akgunduz & 
Plantenga, 2012). The arrangements differ largely among countries, in their length, 
conditions and source of financing, with the emergence of shared entitlements for both 
parents, the most generous ones to be found in European countries. 
The benefits of such leave arrangements include the retaining of workers that would 
otherwise abandon the workforce, allowing the retention of the human capital 
investment, while decreasing employer costs in training a new worker. Leave policies 
are also believed to have a positive effect on reducing the motherhood gap – that is, the 
wage differential for mothers in comparison with their male counterparts when 
controlling for observable variables (Waldfogel, 1998) – together with the general 
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institutional environment, where other concerning variables include the quality of child 
care in the area.  
In recent years, leave programs have been restructured as to encourage fathers to 
also take part in leave, in order to attempt a further decrease in the wage penalty for 
mothers, by strengthening the links of mothers to the labor force; several countries, such 
as Norway and Iceland have introduced leave periods reserved for fathers, the so called 
“daddy months”, with no strong evidence of considerable long-term labor market 
impact of this policy (Ekberg et al, 2013; Patnaik, 2014). 
Parental benefits have their costs and challenges. Group benefits increase the cost 
of labor for the group, thus potentially leading to discrimination against the targets of 
the policy by employers (Ondrich et al, 2003). The penalty may be felt through a 
decline in the progression of wages for the group, which can be associated to a decrease 
in the likelihood of a promotion and to a hiring penalty, as employers will pass the costs 
of the benefits to the group (Baum, 2003). In addition, employees who value the 
increase in benefits will be willing to receive a lower payment, further decreasing wages 
(Summers, 1989). 
In this study, we examine the effects on wages of the changes introduced by the 
revision of the Labor Code published in January 2009, covered by the Decree-Law 
91/2009. Decree-Law 91/2009 represents fundamentally a shift towards a new parental 
leave paradigm, introducing a bonus month that can be used when the leave is shared 
between parents, that is, each parent must take 30 days exclusively to benefit from the 
bonus. The change is followed by a rise in take-up rates – 0.6% of parents shared leave 
up to 2009; in 2012, 28% of the parental leave subsidies granted were shared. 
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Additional benefits introduced by the reform include a longer mandatory initial leave 
for fathers and an optional extended leave at a lower pay. 
The motivation for this study lies in the lack of literature on the effects of leave 
benefits for the Portuguese case, aiming to both fill the gap in the literature by applying 
the methods used in similar paradigms and inspire future works. 
Microdata from Portuguese labor dataset Quadros de Pessoal is used for the years 
2007-2012, employing a methodology of difference-in-differences. The main treatment 
group is comprised of individuals aged [25-40], while individuals aged [55-60] 
constitute the main control group. The choice of the groups results from an analysis of 
the potential and real main users of these benefits, through data on the use of leave and 
the percentage of live-births by age group in 2009. The possible treatment-control pair 
groups that follow are then held to the parallel trend assumption – controlling for the 
covariates available, it is verified whether the pair was following a similar common 
wage trend prior to the legislation change. The assumption here is simple: the pair 
would have kept the parallel trend if not for the policy change.  
Results show a persistent statistically significant negative effect of the policy on 
hourly wages. The difference-in-differences (DD) estimation shows a negative effect of 
-3.6% for the treatment group that is statistically significant, with a greater effect for the 
male group (-4%). These findings are robust to the use of alternative group and period 
specifications. Findings are consistent with the theory of mandated benefits and 
illustrate the extent of the shift to wages following an increase in the cost for the 
employer. Subgroup analysis indicates larger negative results for individuals with 
higher education and those working in skilled positions; these happen to be the groups 
perceived to have a higher estimated cost for the employer following the policy change. 
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Additional subgroup analysis finds similar coefficients for permanent and non-
permanent workers. 
This study is divided in a total of six chapters. Chapter 2 establishes the Portuguese 
setting regarding family-work balance and introduces the new legislation, while Chapter 
3 reviews the most relevant literature. Chapter 4 presents the data and methodology 
used in the experiment, while Chapter 5 is reserved for analysis and discussion of the 
obtained results. Chapter 6 concludes and suggests further studies. 
2. Contextual Setting 
2.1. Notes on the Portuguese setting  
 
In 2009 the Portuguese synthetic fertility index (SFI) stood at 1.3 following a 
decrease from 2001’s SFI of 1.5. The average EU-25 SFI at the time was significantly 
superior at 1.8. The situation in Portugal however is not one of childlessness – 95% of 
the Portuguese women at the time had one or more descendants – but one of a high rate 
of the only-child. The average age at childbirth was 29.7 in 2009, an increase from 28.7 
in 2001 (Wall et al, 2010). 
At the same time, Portugal in 2006 is above the average of the European Union 
when it comes to the participation of the parents in the labor market, with 76.9% of 
mothers working in a formal function, comparing to the average of the EU-27 of 67%. 
In general, data shows motherhood has, as expected, a negative effect on women’s 
employment rate, with the reverse happening for men, who display a rise in the 
employment rate (Margherita et al, 2009). 
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On the other hand, the share of women aged 25-49 working part-time is, at 3.3%, 
significantly lower than the average EU-27 of 24.7% in 2006. The lower rates of part-
time employment in Portugal and in Southern Europe can in general be explained 
through the lower wage levels and the shorter availability of part-time schemes, 
although certainly social and culture factors are at play (Margherita et al, 2009). 
It is also relevant to notice that the Portuguese gender pay gap decreased by 0.3 pp 
from 2010 to 2011, being at 12.5% significantly lower than the average for the EU-27 
(16.2%) (European Commission, 2013). 
A relevant aspect to point out is the gap between the end of parental leave and the 
entitlement of the child to public childcare. Entitlement to placement in pre-school for 
children aged five years old was introduced in 2009 (Law no. 85/2009) – younger 
children may be left outside the formal system for unavailability of place. In 2006, 75% 
of children aged three to five were in the formal childcare service system while the 
percentage for children younger than three was 33% (Moss, 2009). In parallel to the 
formal system, informal childcare needs to be taken into account, with authors pointing 
the high rates of intensive childcare provided by the grandparents in Southern European 
countries such as Italy, Spain and Portugal (Janta, 2014). 
 
2.2. A New Legal Framework for Parental Benefits 
 
Prior to the 2009 legislation reform explored in this study, maternity leave was 
regulated by several disperse regulations, covering 120 or 150 days of absence. The 
former was paid at 100 per cent, while the latter had 80 per cent payment1. 
                                                 
1 See Law no. 18/98, Decree-Law 230/2000 and Decree-Law 77/2005. 
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The EU legislation in place at the time dated back to 19922, mandating a minimum 
14 weeks with an adequate pay, comparable to sick leave. In 2009, longer leave periods 
(nine months or over) were provided in German, Eastern Europe and the Nordic 
countries (Moss, 2009). 
The changes introduced are a shift to a legal framework that promotes the sharing 
of responsibilities between both parents and a better conciliation between professional 
and family life. The relevant legislation is found in the revision of the Labor Code (Law 
no. 7/2009, 12th of February 2009) regulated by the Decree-Law 89/2009 – applicable to 
public workers, and the Decree-Law 91/2009, the object of this study. The new 
framework came into effect in May 2009. 
The changes in benefits we are considering for this study are the following: 
 Increase of the Initial Parental Leave when shared between parents; 
 Increase of the paternal exclusive leave; 
 Increase of the extended parental leave. 
Decree-Law 91/2009 introduces a bonus month if the parental leave is shared – 
while parents can still opt for the former options (120 days at 100 per cent pay or 150 
days at 80 per cent pay), they may now choose to share a 150-day leave with full 
payment or a 180-day leave with 83 per cent payment.  
To benefit from the sharing option, each parent must take an exclusive leave period 
of at least 30 days3, taking into account that the first 42 days post birth are reserved for 
the mother. Additionally, the mother is also able to use up to 30 days of the available 
leave period before birth. 
                                                 
2 See Council Directive 92/85/EEC. 
3 Parents may choose between 30 consecutive days or two periods of 15 days. 
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Figure 1 displays the options available to the parents in terms of the number of days 
and respective payment, when both meet the requisites to apply for initial parental 
leave. The darker area represents the number of days that are available for sharing 
between parents, given that both qualify for shared leave. 
As to be eligible to take leave, the mother or father must have a record of six months 
of registered earnings, consecutive or interpolated at the time of the leave start. The 
payment of the leave subsidy is then computed through the average of the gross 
earnings for the first six months within the last eight months prior to taking the leave 
and funded through the Social Security System, for which employers and employees are 
required to contribute.  
Parents who do not meet this requirement may still be granted the social parental 
leave, in the situation of a low family income, introduced in 2008. For the sharing 
option of the Initial Parental Leave to be available, both parents are required to be 
eligible for leave taking, either through past contributions or social leave. 
Note that the new conditions for the Initial Parental Leave do not, in the end, extend 
the length of the initial leave available for mothers, since as to benefit from the 150/180 
Figure 1 – Initial Parental Leave options (shared and non-shared) 
Source: Decree-Law 91/2009. Notes: Period marked with (a) is for the mother’s exclusive use. 
B. Alexandrino | THE EFFECTS OF THE INCREASE IN PARENTAL LEAVE BENEFITS ON WAGES 
10 
 
days of shared leave, at least 30 days are for the exclusive use of the father. Therefore, 
the available days for the mother in a shared leave scenario, with the father taking the 
minimum 30 exclusive days to qualify, are the 120 and 150 days, the same time period 
as the one established by the previous legislation. 
The introduction of these benefits for parents is followed by interesting claim rates 
displayed in Table 1 – from May 2009 (the start of the legislation) to the end of the 
year, 28 per cent of Initial Parental Leave arrangements were shared.  
 
Table 1 – Leave-Taking Statistics 
 
Table 1 displays both a decrease of live births in Portugal and an increase of 
percentage of parents covered by leave benefits, in the years 2007-2012, which is in part 
explained by the introduction of the social leave. Previous research found the renaming 
of benefits (in this case, from maternity and paternity leave to parental leave), on par 
with financial incentives, may increase leave-taking rates, as individuals appear to 
answer to “daddy-only” labels (Patnaik, 2014). 
Decree-Law 91/2009 also increases the mandatory father-only parental leave, not 
accounted for in the 150/180 Initial Parental Leave scheme, from the previous 5 
mandatory days after birth to 10 mandatory working days, to use in the 30 days 
following the birth of the child – 5 of which have to be taken consecutively following 
 
2007 2008 2009 (a) 2010 2011 2012 
Number of Live-births 102 492 104 594 67 924 101 381 96 856 89 841 
Number of Maternity/Parental Leave subsidies granted 75 297 82 380 53 831 80 494 81 300 75 553 
Parental Leave coverage (%) 73.5 78.8 79.3 79.4 83.9 84.1 
       Shared Parental Leave (%) (b)     27.6 24.7 25.0 27.5 
150 days (% of Shared PL)     42.2 42.5 40.7 41.2 
180 days (% of Shared PL)     57.8 57.5 59.3 58.8 
       
       
Source: Statistics Portugal (2013), Social Security Account 2012 - Part II (MTSS, 2012), Wall et al (2012). Author's calculations. 
Notes: (a) As the new legislation start took place in May, for 2009 we are only considering the period May-December. (b) For this 
calculation we exclude Social Parental Leave. The no. of Parental leave subsidies considered are thus the following: 2009 - 42 
548, 2010 - 63 575, 2011 - 65 292, 2012 - 59 995. 
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the birth. Conversely, the 15 additional optional days are reduced to 10 optional days – 
consecutive or not – that can be used simultaneously with the mother. This father-
exclusive leave is paid at 100 per cent.  
Furthermore, the reform adds an extended parental leave of three months that can be 
used by each parent.4 The extended leave period is paid at 25 per cent of earnings. 
Claim rates for this option are the following – a total of 1 214 in 2009, 2 179 in 2010 
and 2 415 in 2011. 
Decree-Law 91/2009 also introduces a change that is out of the scope of this study, 
namely an increase in benefits for taking care of a sick child, by increasing the 
maximum established age of the dependent child to 12 years. Furthermore, these 
benefits were extended to grandparents, while 15 extra unpaid days were also added.  
It is important to notice that for the layoff of a permanent worker who is pregnant, 
breastfeeding or using parental leave to be allowed, the employer has to previously 
require the approval of the competent administrative body, the Portuguese Commission 
for Equality in Labor and Employment (CITE)5. However, if the employee is working 
under a fixed-term contract the non-renewal of the contract is possible – the only 
condition being that the decision is notified to CITE. Therefore, as one of the possible 
outcomes of the introduction of benefits, employers may limit the access of the target 
group to permanent contracts. Additionally, employees working under a fixed-term 
contract may opt not to use their preferred option of the benefits available or to 
postpone the decision of having children. 
                                                 
4 The options for use of the extended leave are the following: (1) three months starting after the end of the 
initial parental leave, (2) twelve months with normal working hours reduced to half, (3) interpolated 
periods of leave or part-time work, where the total duration of the leave and time reduction is equal to the 
normal working period of three months and (4 – exclusive to workers under the collective labor 
bargaining agreement) non-consecutive absences from work amounting to the normal working period for 
three months. 
5 See Decree-Law 70/2000 and Decree-Law 230/2000. 
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3. Literature Review 
3.1. Theoretical Background 
According to the theory, the predicted effects of leave benefits on wages and 
employment are ambiguous (Baum, 2003).  
Ruhm (1998) states that as the access to parental leave depends on requiring 
employers to provide these arrangements when costs surpass benefits, these are 
intrinsically inefficient in economic terms, when considering perfect information and no 
externalities. Summers (1989) adds to the idea by arguing that were the value of the 
arrangement to be higher than the employer cost in providing it, the employer would 
provide it without the need of a mandate. 
As this is not the case – it is mandatory that the employer offers the leave 
arrangements stated by the law, provided the worker meets the requirements – labor 
demand will shift down, decreasing wages and the level of employment. (Gruber & 
Krueger, 1991; Gruber, 1994; Ruhm, 1998; Summers, 1989) Figure 2 intends to 
visually display the mechanisms here described – as such, D0 will shift to D1. 
The amount of contraction of the labor demand curve will be dependent on the 
employer costs. Costs of leave incurred by the employer include the replacement of the 
worker either by hiring a temporary worker or by demanding the remaining staff to 
substitute the parent away on leave. Temporary workers are linked to training costs and 
a possible loss of productivity as they have less human capital specific to the firm 
(Baum, 2003). When there is no replacement in place, there is an increase in the tasks 
for the remaining workers, with possible paid overtime, and/or a reduction of the 
activities during the period. In general, shorter periods of leave are associated with a 
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lower replacement rate (Akgunduz & Plantenga, 2012). Accordingly, a European 
Parliament (2010) report shows a replacement rate in European countries of 30% for 
maternity leave and 0% for paternity leave for 2008 data. 
On the other hand, it can be argued that the demand curve may shift to the right as 
parental leave is protecting the human capital that is specific to the firm, leading to an 
increase in the worker’s productivity after the absence (Ruhm, 1998). This theory is 
further reiterated by Klerman & Leibowitz (1999) by arguing that the introduction of 
maternity benefits results in a retention of women who would otherwise leave the 
workforce and perhaps find a different firm and position in a future return. A 
withdrawal from the labor force represents a loss of human capital for the firm and for 
the mother who will not benefit from the job-specific experience accumulated prior to 
the birth (Waldfogel, 1998). Following this reasoning, an increase in the leave period 
would theoretically result in a positive effect on wages through the protection of firm-
worker relationships (Klerman & Leibowitz, 1999). In further considerations of the 
Figure 2 – The effects of a mandated benefit 
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relevance of individual human capital, it can be conversely argued that by promoting the 
absence of the worker, leave policies can reduce the experience of the worker, and thus 
their wage rate.  
As the object of this study is a policy funded through contributions to social 
security, it is comparable to Summers’ (1989) mandated benefits, in that there is an 
important link between the benefit and its cost. Past contributions of the worker are 
often used to finance programs such as unemployment insurance, sick leave and 
parental leave. Therefore, there will be an incentive for individuals who value the 
benefit to offer their labor at a lower reservation wage, increasing labor supply (Centeno 
& Novo, 2013). Additionally, individuals working in the informal sector who value 
parental leave may shift to the formal sector as to qualify for the benefits. The cost is 
consequently covering part of the benefit valued by the employee.  
Therefore, parental leave may result in the increase of labor supply following 1) the 
willingness of workers who value the benefit to accept a lower wage and 2) the move of 
individuals to the formal labor force. In Figure 2 this is displayed by the shift to the 
right of 𝑠0 to 𝑠1. As reasoned by Ruhm (1998), the effect of the continuing link to the 
labor force of the worker after the use of benefits will also contribute to the increase of 
labor supply.  
In the end, the extent of the shift in demand together with the change in supply will 
define the effects of the reform on wages and employment. The impact on employment 
is considered to be ambiguous (Baum, 2003), as the length of the leave periods may 
either result in the detachment of women from the labor market or in the strengthening 
of their ties (Klerman & Leibowitz, 1999; Waldfogel, 2008). 
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On the other hand, the effect on wages is generally a negative one for the group 
targeted by the introduction of benefits, taking however into account that a full shift to 
wages may not be possible due to antidiscrimination laws and low or minimum-wage 
earners with slight room for adjustment (Gruber, 1994). 
3.2. Empirical Findings 
The literature on the labor market effects of the introduction of parental leave 
benefits is wide and may be classified by data – aggregate or individual-level – and type 
of leave - paid or unpaid, the latter encompassing studies for the United States case. 
Most of the studies here discussed regard maternity leave; however, findings for further 
mandated benefits are also included. 
A staple in aggregate-level research on the topic, Ruhm (1998) investigates the 
labor market effects of (paid) parental leave using data for nine European countries over 
the period 1969-1993. All the countries analyzed had unsurprisingly important changes 
happening during the period considered, with significant variations in the length of 
leave across nations, ranging from 14 weeks in Ireland to 64 weeks in Sweden in 1993. 
The author uses a methodology of difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD), 
controlling for time and country. As parental leave at the time was mainly used by 
women, men will form the control group for the experiment. Results suggest that for 
shorter periods of length of three months there is an increase in the level of employment 
and a minor effect on wages, while longer leave mandates, defined as nine months, 
result in a decrease in hourly earnings. 
Akgunduz and Plantenga (2012) extend the study by using aggregate-level data 
from 1970 to 2010 for sixteen European countries. While keeping Ruhm’s (1998) DDD 
model, the authors accommodate for the increase in the father’s use of parental benefits 
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by using older men (45-54) as the control group. Results show once again a positive 
effect on female participation rates, although there is now a lower increase in 
employment, followed by a decrease in wages that is larger for higher-skill positions 
and insignificant for lower-skilled, such as manufacturing jobs. The reasoning suggested 
is that the risk of depreciation of human capital during the leave period is higher for 
higher-skilled jobs; additionally, wages for lower-skilled jobs may be close to the 
minimum or starting wages not leaving much room for a shift to wages.  
Regarding individual-level data studies, there exists a range of literature 
encompassing the US case for unpaid leave; in 1993, the Family and Medical Act 
(FMLA) offered 12 weeks of unpaid leave for eligible women. Waldfogel (1999) uses 
data from 1992 to 1995 to analyze the effects of the FMLA on employment and wages, 
by comparing the effects on states with and without some previous type of maternity 
leave implemented. Once again, the methodology used consists in a difference-in-
differences estimator, taking young women as a treatment group, while men and older 
women form the control groups. Results do not find significant effects of the policy in 
either employment or wages. 
Baum (2003) builds on Waldfogel’s (1999) study to analyze the effects of the 
FMLA, by using a different panel database that allows the following of individuals from 
1986 to 1994. The author suggests the insignificant effects found by Waldfogel (1999) 
are due to an inaccurate identification of the employers covered by the policy. As only 
employers with 50 or more employees are required to provide the benefit, many 
individuals included in the former study do not actually have access to the FMLA. The 
DDD estimation shows again an insignificant effect on employment and wages. The 
author suggests as potential explanations, the short length of the leave, the existence of 
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parental leave benefits voluntarily provided by several employers prior to the reform, 
and finally, the fact that the leave introduced is unpaid.  
Indeed, the effects of paid leave can be quite different. By being more accessible to 
less privileged employees who face financial constraints (for example, individuals with 
less years of schooling and single mothers), take-up rates have less disparities and are 
close to universal. Results show accordingly that when replacing an unpaid program to a 
paid one, effects are most significant in underprivileged individuals (Rossin-Slater et al, 
2013; Baker & Milligan, 2008). 
Rossin-Slater et al (2013) study the effects of the first paid family leave program in 
the US, the CA-PFL introduced in California in 2004, by using data from 1999 to 2010. 
The authors apply a difference-in-differences model comparing the period prior and 
post the policy implementation, using mothers with young children as a treatment group 
and several control groups: women with older children, or none at all, men with older 
children, women with young children living in other states. The study finds that CA-
PFL more than doubled leave-taking, suggesting the expansion of the benefits to less 
advantaged individuals. Results show a significant increase in weekly work hours of 5 
to 6% and an insignificant increase on wages, possibly related to the increase in work 
hours. 
Baum & Ruhm (2016) extend the study by using longitudinal data to examine the 
effects of the CA-PFL, following a more precise information on the location and timing 
of births. The authors apply a difference-in-differences model, identifying parents with 
work experience during the period of pregnancy as the potential users of parental leave, 
thus forming the treatment group. The control group is formed by parents with older 
children. Findings are less expressive than the ones by Rossin-Slater et al (2013): there 
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is a smaller estimated increase in hourly wages with confidence intervals that 
encompass zero or negative results. 
Gruber (1994) explores the effects of the introduction of maternity mandates 
through the mandatory coverage of childbirth in the health insurance provided by 
employers. The treatment group used is formed by married women aged 20-40, while 
the control groups consist on individuals over 40 and single men aged 20-40. As the 
legislation was introduced in a first instance in certain states (“experimental states”) 
prior to the nationwide implementation in 1978, the empirical strategy consists on a 
DDD model, comparing state and year effects. Results show a negative and statistically 
significant effect on wages, suggesting the target group of the policy is bearing the costs 
of the mandate. The shift of the costs to wages implies the targeted group values the 
policy and there were no obstacles in the adjustment of wages. 
In turn, Fernández-Kranz & Rodriguez-Planas (2013) study the effects of Spanish 
Law 39/1999 that protects from dismissal workers who had previously applied for a 
part-time arrangement over parental responsibilities. The duality in permanent/fixed-
term contracts in the Spanish labor market makes this a particularly interesting study 
due to the similarities with the Portuguese case. Although the program was open to both 
parents, the users of the optional arrangements were mostly women; as such, women of 
childbearing age form the treatment group. Findings show an increase in the likelihood 
of the transition from both permanent and fixed-term contract to unemployment, as well 
as a decrease in the likelihood of a promotion to a permanent contract from a fixed-term 
position. Results also show a negative adjustment in wages for the group. 
The negative effect on wages resulting from the introduction of mandated benefits 
is not exclusive to the case of parental benefits – Anderson & Meyer (1997) find the 
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introduction of unemployment insurance results in a decrease of wages, as the costs of 
the insurance are shifted to the workers’ wages, while Gruber & Krueger (1991) find 
similar results for the introduction of compensation insurance to workers, with 
employees supporting the cost of the mandated benefit. 
4. Data and Methodology 
4.1. Data 
The data source used is the Quadros de Pessoal, an administrative data set collected 
on an annual basis by the Ministry of Labor, Solidarity, and Social Security that 
provides a wide range of information on the matched employer-employee pairs. The 
survey is of compulsory participation for all the firms within the Portuguese private 
sector, thus being regularly used as a source of information for the empirical analysis of 
the national labor market. The information collected reports to the month of October of 
the reference year. 
For each individual in the sample, it is selected the information regarding wage, 
age, gender, education, qualification, type of employment contract and occupation; in 
terms of employer data, the variables extracted are the district where the firm operates 
and its economic sector. 
The dependent variable used is the hourly wage presented in a natural logarithm, as 
to allow for an effective analysis of the percentage effect in the dependent variable 
(Gelman & Hill, 2007). Wages are adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price 
Index from Statistics Portugal and considering 2011 prices. Additionally, individuals 
with an hourly rate inferior to EUR 1 or higher than EUR 100 are excluded. 
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Moreover, observations are dropped for every individual that is not an employee 
working for an employer, including employers, family workers, members of a producer 
cooperative, as well as individuals in a different or non-specified situation. 
Furthermore, individuals with unavailable social security number and age are 
excluded. For the purpose of the experiment, observations for employers operating in 




In order to explore the effects of the parental leave reform on the target group, it is 
employed a methodology of differences-in-differences, by selecting two groups – a 
treatment group targeted by the new legislation and a control group. The difference-in-
differences model will have the following form: 
 log⁡(𝑌𝑖𝑡) = ⁡α⁡ +⁡𝛽1𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 +⁡𝛽2𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 ⁡+ ⁡𝛽3𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 × 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 ⁡+𝑊𝑖𝑡𝛾 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1) 
for individual i in year t. 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is our variable of interest – the real hourly wage and 𝑊𝑖𝑡 is 
a set of observable characteristics for both the employee and the firm defined by the 
variables enumerated in 4.1. 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 is a dummy set to one for the period covered by the 
legislation, from 2009 to 2012, and zero for the period before, 2007 and 2008. 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 is 
a dummy variable that equals 1 for treatment group, that is, the individuals that can be 
pointed as the users of the benefits (this will be explored below) and 0 for the control 
group, that is, the individuals that do not appear to be the target of the policy. 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 ×
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖⁡is the interaction term of interest and ?̂?3, the coefficient, will measure the effects 
of the legislation change on the treated group. 
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Considering Decree-Law 91/2009 had its effective start in May 2009, the after 
period is considered as 2009-2012 (Period Specification 1). Additionally, and 
considering the changes taken place during the second trimester, while the information 
collected by the Quadros de Pessoal regards the month of October, the model is applied 
for the after period 2010-2012 (Period Specification 2) and an after period starting in 
2010 with observations from 2009 excluded from the sample (Period Specification 3). 
The choice of periods close to the reform has the intent of minimizing possible policy 
interactions. 
Following Bertrand et al (2004), standard errors were clustered at the individual 
level. 
Identification Strategy 
As the changes introduced by the new legal framework target both genders, the 
identification strategy will not be as forward as commonly understood in the literature, 
where typically for a reform of leave benefits, women of childbearing age will form the 
treatment group while their male cohorts are used as a control group. 
Through the analysis of data on live births by age group of females and males in 
2009 and on the beneficiaries of the policy (see Figure 3) it shall be clearer which 
population groups appear to be the object of the new legislation. As such, for both 
genders, the age group [30-34] is shown to be paired with the highest number of live 
births. The patterns for both female and male display great resemblance, the main 
difference stemming clearly from biological differences – the female distribution of live 
births by age group is naturally less scattered. Additionally, for both groups it would be 
reasonable to negate the group formed by individuals older than 50 years old as the 
target of the reform. In sum, we may generally point to the age group comprised of 
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individuals aged [20, 40] as a reasonable treatment group, with individuals aged [50, 65] 
as the control group. 
Figure 3 – Use and Potential use of Leave Benefits 
Panel A - Parental Leave beneficiaries by age group in 2009 
 
Panel B - Live-births by age group of parents in 2009 
 
Source: Statistics Portugal, Social Security Account 2009 - Part II (MTSS, 2009). Author's 
calculations. 
 
In appropriately identifying the treatment and control groups, there is the need to 
conform to the common trend assumption, also known as the parallel paths (Angrist & 
Krueger, 1999). According to this assumption, trends for the treated and control groups 
should not differ prior to the implementation of the new legislation, hence pointing to 
the assumption that, had the reform not been implemented, both groups would have 
maintained identical trends. 
To test for the conformity of the group pairs to the parallel trend assumption, it is 
used the information from Quadros de Pessoal for the period 2002-2008, applying the 
[40 ,  44] [45 ,  49] <20 [20 ,  24] [25 ,  29] [30 ,  34] [35 ,  39] [50 ,  65] 
Female Male 
[45 ,  49] [50 ,  65] [20 ,  24] [25 ,  29] [30 ,  34] [35 ,  39] [40 ,  44] 
Female Male 
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adjustments to the data set described in 4.1.. The test can be summarized in equation (2) 
below: 
 log⁡(𝑌𝑖𝑡) = ⁡𝛽1𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 +⁡𝛽2𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 ⁡+ ⁡𝛽3𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 × 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 ⁡+ 𝑊𝑖𝑡⁡𝛾 +⁡𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2) 
where i denotes the individual and t the time; 𝑌𝑖𝑡  is the variable of interest – the real 
hourly wage, 𝑊𝑖𝑡⁡ is the set of observable characteristics for both the employee and the 
firm, 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 is a dummy variable that equals 1 for treatment group and 0 for control 
group, 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 stands for the trend. 
The regression is employed twice, with and without the set of observable 
characteristics⁡𝑊𝑖𝑡⁡. The ?̂?3 coefficient shall thus be zero when there is a common trend 
between the groups. 
Following the test results for possible pairs to be used in the experiment, the main 
pair 1 is selected, formed by a treatment group comprised of individuals aged [25-40] 
and a control group comprised of individuals aged [55-60], as well as four alternative 
treatment-control pairs. The results for the validation of the common trend for the pairs 
are listed in Table 2. 
Table 2 – Parallel trend validation 
Pairs Treatment Control (1) No Covariates (2) With covariates 
1 [25-40] [55-60] 0.026 0.0003 
   
(0.000) (0.000) 
2 [20-40] [55-65] 0.022 -0.0009 
    
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
3 [25-40] [50-55] 0.020 0.0004 
   
(0.000) (0.000) 
4 [20-40] [50-60] 0.016 0.0004 
   
(0.000) (0.004) 
5 [20-40]  [50-65] 0.018 -0.0006 
      (0.000) (0.000) 
 
Notes: Coefficients for Treat X Time; P-values in parentheses. 
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The test displays statistically significant coefficients for the pairs selected, 
indicating a trend differential in the pre-reform period; however, the negligible 
differences in economic terms when controlling for the elected covariates point to the 
parallel trend requirement being met, thus allowing the difference-in-differences 
estimation. 
Summary statistics for the main sample of treatment and control groups, taken from 
Quadros de Pessoal, are presented in Table 3. The control group has, in both the before 
and after period, a higher hourly wage than the treatment group. In comparison, the 
treatment group is formed by a higher percentage of women, which is explained by the 
higher participation rate of younger women in the labor market. 
It is in the education variable that the differences are more staggering, as the 
treatment group is comprised of individuals who had a larger access to formal 
education, for there is a share of 45% in both periods with secondary and post-
secondary education. In comparison, in the control group more than 50% of the 
individuals, in both periods, had access to the 1st cycle of basic education or no formal 
education at all. 
Regarding the type of employment, the share of the permanent contract is, as 
expected, higher in the control group. More than 80% of the workers in the control 
group have a permanent position in both periods, while the percentage stays at 72% for 
the treatment group is the post period. Workers in the younger age range are thus more 
likely to work in a non-permanent position.  
For both groups and periods, the majority of individuals (more than 95%) are 
working under a full-time contract. More than a third of the individuals are working in 
Lisbon. 
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Table 3 – Summary Statistics by treatment status and period 
 Treatment Control 
Variables Before After Before After 
Hourly wage rate 6.32 6.84 7.45 7.79 
 (5.30) (5.52) (7.60) (8.09) 
Age 31.25 33.86 55.70 58.22 
 (4.41) (4.57) (1.75) (1.93) 
Female (%) 
Education (%) 
47.07 47.38 38.04 39.24 
1st cycle of basic education or under 9.18 7.31 55.17 52.67 
2nd cycle of basic education  19.80 16.87 14.28 14.09 
3rd cycle of basic education 24.91 25.60 15.04 16.59 
Secondary & post-secondary non-tertiary 26.33 22.80 9.05 8.39 
Higher education 19.02 22.60 6.03 6.97 
Unknown 
Occupation (%) 
0.76 4.81 0.42 1.28 
Upper Administration 2.92 3.66 5.93 6.90 
Specialist in intellectual profession 8.59 12.45 3.81 4.85 
Technicians  12.54 12.02 9.52 10.88 
Administrative staff   17.27 16.16 12.18 10.89 
Services workers and sellers   18.28 19.76 14.36 17.16 
Machinery and installation workers  9.10 10.25 13.37 12.79 
Factory workers and related  20.21 16.19 23.71 19.84 
Non-qualified workers 11.08 9.50 17.12 16.69 
Permanent employee (%) 65.03 72.18 83.30 85.85 
Full time (%) 96.31 96.34 96.09 95.10 
Tenure 4.41 5.64 13.95 15.07 
Qualification (%) 
(4.66) (5.40) (12.25) (12.57) 
Upper Management 6.95 8.69 7.15 8.26 
Middle management 5.55 6.73 4.31 4.86 
Coordinators, team managers  2.83 4.65 6.17 6.69 
Highly qualified professionals 8.55 9.06 7.68 7.61 
Qualified professionals  40.77 40.05 39.53 38.65 
Skilled professionals 15.49 17.42 16.44 18.19 
Unskilled workers 10.05 8.47 13.70 13.34 
Trainees and interns 4.81 3.34 0.45 0.51 
Other 
District (%) 
5.01 1.60 4.57 1.88 
Lisbon 34.68 37.64 35.61 36.31 
Other districts  
Sector (%) 
65.32 62.36 64.39 63.69 
Manufacturing 23.68 22.25 26.85 25.05 
Electricity, gas and water supply  0.31 0.42 1.18 1.38 
Construction 11.91 9.69 13.28 11.71 
Wholesale, retail trade, repair motor 21.58 20.95 15.93 15.84 
Accomodation and food service  6.50 6.15 7.31 7.79 
Transportation and storage 5.54 6.31 7.90 7.66 
Financial and insurance 3.21 3.97 3.55 3.35 
Real Estate 14.14 15.53 9.94 10.80 
Public administration 0.62 0.56 1.15 0.62 
Education 2.56 2.27 2.10 2.05 
Health and Social Work 6.36 7.96 7.17 9.20 
Other service activities 3.59 3.93 3.64 4.54 
Extraterritorial organisations and bodies 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
No. of observations 2 659 140 4 206 621 390 548 473 058 
 
Notes:  Mean values reported for the main pair - treatment group comprised of individuals aged [25-
40] and control group comprised of individuals aged [55-60]. Before Period: 2007-2008, After Period: 
2009-2012. Standard deviation reported in parenthesis.  
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5. Results and Discussion 
In this section, the effects of the 2009 increase in parental leave benefits on the real 
hourly wages for the target group shall be presented and discussed. 
Table 4 presents the difference-in-differences estimates using the main pair, 
comprised of treated individuals aged [25-40] and control individuals aged [55-60]. All 
models control for covariates, following the best results for the common trend 
validation when using this set of variables.  
Estimates are reported for both the fixed-effects (FE) model and the pooled 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). As shown by Angrist & Pischke (2009), these 
estimators produce identical results when using a balanced panel set; however, the data 
used in this study consists of an unbalanced panel, in which case these estimators would 
thus provide different results. We follow Lechner et al (2015), who argue that OLS may 
be more appropriate for the case of an unbalanced panel. 
Results show a negative impact of the policy on real hourly wages of 3.6% for the 
full treatment group, that is statistically significant, when considering the FE model and 
the first period specification (Table 4.1., Panel A). The effect is larger when considering 
the second period specification, where the “after” period starts in 2010 (-5%), and even 
larger with the third specification, where 2009 is removed from the data (-6%).  
The larger effects can be explained by the small amount of time between the 
legislation change, in May, and the collection of Quadros de Pessoal data, in October. 
Five months might not have been enough time for the wage shifting mechanisms to 
fully take place. It may also be argued that, at the time the policy was introduced, there 
was no previous experience with “daddy months” in Portugal and therefore, employers 
were not aware of the costs they would expectably face as a result of the new rules. 
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Indeed, empirical evidence shows the potential unawareness of a new benefits policy 
even years after its introduction (Appelbaum & Milkman, 2011). 
 
Table 4 – Difference-in-differences estimates 
Pair 1 – T: [25-40], C: [55-60] 
 
 
Panel A - Individual FE 
 
Panel B - Pooled OLS 
 
[1] [2] [3] 
 
[1] [2] [3] 
1. Full Sample 
After 0.101 0.023 0.108 
 
0.026 -0.010 0.007 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Treat -0.389 0.126 -0.331 
 
-0.001 0.045 0.030 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.700) (0.000) (0.000) 
After X Treat -0.037 -0.050 -0.061 
 
-0.031 -0.023 -0.030 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 7 729 036 7 729 036 6 263 298 
 
7 729 036 7 729 036 6 263 298 
        2. Female 
After 0.103 0.023 0.107 
 
0.034 -0.005 0.014 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
Treat -0.316 0.208 -0.266 
 
0.004 0.052 0.037 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.381) (0.000) (0.000) 
After X Treat -0.035 -0.047 -0.055 
 
-0.034 -0.027 -0.033 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 3 578 637 3 578 637 2 901 667 
 
3 578 637 3 578 637 2 901 667 
        3. Male 
After 0.102 0.026 0.112 
 
0.023 -0.011 0.004 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.045) 
Treat -0.410 0.108 -0.347 
 
0.005 0.050 0.035 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
 
(0.304) (0.000) (0.000) 
After X Treat -0.040 -0.055 -0.070 
 
-0.032 -0.025 -0.032 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 4 150 399 4 150 399 3 361 631   4 150 399 4 150 399 3 361 631 
 
Notes: Estimates are reported for the main pair - treatment group comprised of individuals aged [25-40] and control 
group comprised of individuals aged [55-60]. [1] Before Period: 2007-2008, After Period: 2009-2012; [2] Before Period: 
2007-2009, After Period: 2010-2012; [3] Before Period: 2007-2008, After Period: 2010-2012. P-values adjusted for 
clustering are reported in parentheses. 
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However, leave taking statistics display relevant take-up rates for the new options 
introduced by the legislation. This implies that workers value the benefit, and that 
employers consider higher perceived labor costs for the target group. Therefore, 
findings pointing to negative effects are not surprising: the potential receivers of the 
policy are bearing (at least part of) its costs, in line with Gruber (1994). 
The estimates using the pooled OLS model, in Panel B, also display negative 
coefficients, albeit smaller in size. Following Fernandez-Kranz & Rodrigues-Planas 
(2013), a smaller coefficient in the OLS model suggests the existence of positive 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
Regressions are conducted for the full sample (4.1.) and by gender (4.2. and 4.3.), 
as the specifications of the policy are different for female and male users. The analysis 
by gender is also justified by the different labor market behavior of the gender groups. 
There is once again a negative effect on wages for both genders that is larger when 
excluding the first year in which the legislation took force. The impact is greater for 
male employees, with a negative effect of 4% for the main period specification, using 
the FE model. This can be justified by the fact that this reform truly consisted in a 
change of paradigm, by stimulating take up of parental benefits by the fathers (rather 
than only the mothers), which appears to have been widely embraced. 
In Table 5, this effect is estimated for four alternative pairs, as to test the robustness 
of the results. These groups survived the common trend analysis in the previous chapter, 
when using the set of covariates.  
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Table 5 – DD Estimates for alternative treatment-control pairs 









































Covariates Yes   Yes   Yes 
No. of observations 9 142 553   4 215 985   4 926 568 
      
B. Pair 3 - T: [25-40], C: [50-55] 






























Covariates Yes   Yes   Yes 
No. of observations 8 269 016   3 830 436   4 438 580 
      































Covariates Yes   Yes   Yes 
No. of observations 10 078 433   4 619 041   5 459 392 
      






























Covariates Yes   Yes   Yes 
No. of observations 10 359 329   4 727 923   5 631 406 
 
Notes: Estimates are reported for four alternative treatment-control group pairs. Before 
Period: 2007-2008, After Period: 2009-2012. P-values adjusted for clustering are reported in 
parentheses. 
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The first column reports estimates for the full sample, while the next ones present 
the effects for each gender. Across all the pairs used, the effects of the policy in the 
different treated groups are negative, with coefficients ranging from -0.023 to -0.038 for 
the full sample. The impact of the policy is estimated to be more expressive for men, 
with a largest effect of -4% for the treated male individuals of Pair 2. 
Table 6 provides information for the subgroup estimates of After X Treat, by the 
level of schooling, qualification and type of contract of the worker. 
In A, coefficients are presented for workers with no more than high school and for 
those with higher education, thus excluding workers in a non-specified situation 
regarding their level of schooling. Estimates display a larger effect for individuals with 
higher education, estimated to be -9%, compared to -2.5% for individuals with high 
school level or below. A possible explanation is the following: as employers 
discriminate against the potential target of the new leave options, following Gruber 
(1994), they will do so more against individuals with higher education, since these are, 
according to Rossin-Slater et al (2013), generally more likely to use these benefits. 
In a similar fashion, for B, subgroups are created according to their qualifications. 
In the group Qualified to Upper Management, the following labor situations are 
included: upper management, middle management, coordinators and team managers, 
highly qualified and qualified professionals. In the group Trainees and Interns to Skilled 
there are included skilled professionals (also denominated semi-qualified professionals), 
unskilled workers and trainees and interns. Findings show a difference of about 2 
percentage points between these groups, with a larger effect of -4% for the qualified 
group. The reasoning presented above can be applied once again, as qualified workers 
are more likely to use the benefits than the less qualified, thus representing a higher  
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Table 6 – Subgroup Difference-in-differences Estimates 








A. By education 











No. of observations 5 985 774 
 
2 602 222 
 
3 383 552 
      
















            
B. By qualification 











No. of observations 5 194 522 
 
2 218 860 
 
2 975 662 
      











No. of observations 2 034 875 
 
1 129 359 
 
905 516 
            













No. of observations 5 496 726 
 
2 538 749 
 
2 957 977 













No. of observations 2 232 310 
 
1 039 888 
 
1 192 422 
            
Notes: Estimates for After X Treat are reported for the specified subgroups of Pair 
1 - T: [25-40] C: [55-60]. Before Period: 2007-2008, After Period: 2009-2012. P-
values adjusted for clustering are reported in parentheses. 
 
estimated cost to an employer. Additionally, it can be argued that the estimated costs of 
the loss of human capital due to the participation in parental benefits may be higher for 
more qualified workers (Akgunduz & Plantenga, 2012). Furthermore, there may be 
potential obstacles to the wage adjustment for the less qualified group, such as workers 
earning minimum-wage (Gruber, 1994). 
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In C, the full sample is split by the type of contract, i.e. permanent or non-
permanent. Findings display a negative effect in both cases, albeit larger for the latter. 
Non-permanent workers may be less likely to use the preferred option of the benefit 
than permanent workers, as there is a large gap in the protection offered: recalling 
Chapter 2, a fixed-term worker who intends to use the lengthier option may be 
dissuaded to do so, as he is not protected from his fixed-term contract not being 
renewed. Also, the protection generally granted in permanent contracts, regarding both 
wage level and job security may hinder the wage adjustment mechanism. Furthermore, 
as most of the new jobs are fixed-term contracts, these are easier to adjust by offering 
from the start a lower wage, thus covering the increase in expected costs (Centeno & 
Novo, 2013). It should however be taken into account the limitations in this particular 
subgroup analysis, as permanent (non-permanent) workers belonging to the younger 
treatment group may generally have a different profile from permanent (non-permanent) 
workers in the more experienced control group. 
As unobserved factors may have different impacts on the treatment and control 
groups, a falsification exercise is conducted, to further test for the robustness of the 
obtained results. Placebo-treatment groups are used, composed of individuals aged [50-
55] and [55-60]. As shown in Figure 2, these individuals should not be considered 
neither as the target of the policy nor as potential users of these benefits.  
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A variation of equation (1) is estimated for this exercise: 
 log⁡(𝑌𝑖𝑡) = ⁡α⁡ +⁡𝛽1𝑝𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 +⁡𝛽2𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 ⁡+ ⁡𝛽3𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 × 𝑝𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 ⁡+ 𝑊𝑖𝑡𝛾 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (3) 
for individual i in year t. 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the real hourly wage, 𝑊𝑖𝑡 is a set of observable 
characteristics, 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 is a dummy set to one for the period covered by the legislation, 
from 2009 to 2012, and zero for the period before, 2007 and 2008. 𝑝𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 for the placebo-treatment group and 0 for the control group (see 
below). 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 × 𝑝𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖⁡is the interaction term of interest. 
The placebo-treated and control groups used are listed below: 
 Pair F1 – Placebo treatment: [50-55], Control: [60-65] 
 Pair F2 – Placebo treatment: [50-55], Control: [56-65] 
 Pair F3 – Placebo treatment: [50-55], Control: [56-60] 
 Pair F4 – Placebo treatment: [55-60], Control: [61-65] 
The results, presented in Table 7, show statistically significant coefficients of the 
𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 × 𝑝𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 estimator, albeit less expressive than the results of the experiment.  
However, when tested for the parallel trend (Table 8), the groups display a trend 
differential in the pre-reform period that may have continued through the after period.  
This undermines the validity of these findings, which would otherwise suggest a 
possible overestimation of the effects of Decree-Law 91/2009 in our model. 
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Table 7 — DD Estimates for placebo-treated and control pairs 










































Covariates Yes   Yes   Yes 
No. of observations 1,784,325   732,229   1,052,096 
      Pair F2 – Placebo-treated: [50-55], Control: [56-65] 






























Covariates Yes   Yes   Yes 
No. of observations 2,361,222   954,984   1,406,238 































Covariates Yes   Yes   Yes 
No. of observations 2,080,326   846,102   1,234,224 






























Covariates Yes   Yes   Yes 
No. of observations 3,638,135   1,543,287   2,094,848 
 
Notes: Estimates are reported for the chosen placebo-treated - control group pairs. Before Period: 2007-
2008, After Period: 2009-2012. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 8 — Parallel trend test for placebo-treated and control pairs 
 
Pairs Treatment Control (1) No Covariates (2) With covariates 




F2 [50-55] [56-65] 0.009 -0.0028 
      (0.000) (0.000) 




F4 [55-60] [61-65] 0.008 -0.0027 
      (0.000) (0.000) 
 
Notes: Coefficients for Treat X Time; P-values in parentheses. 
 
In addition, it must be ensured that no other policy changes had a differential impact 
on the treatment group used in the experiment. During the period in study, several 
measures targeting families were introduced, such as: 
 An increase in the period and scope of absence to care for a sick child to 
grandparents (Decree-Law 91/2009);  
 The introduction of an adoption leave of 120/150 days, with added sharing 
bonus (Decree-Law 91/2009); 
 The correspondence of ranks from the Child Allowance to the School Social 
Action (Legislative Order 20956/2008), leading to an increase of student 
beneficiaries of this support; 
 The introduction of a “student pass” for public transportation, offering a 50 
percent reduction for secondary or basic school students with ages up to 18 years 
old (Decree-Law 186/2008) and later on extended to higher education students 
with ages up to 23 years old (Decree-Law 203/2009); 
 Entitlement to placement in pre-school for children aged five years old (Law no. 
85/2009). 
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These policies are considered to either have targeted both groups selected for the 
study or to have at most a small and/or indirect impact on wages, for which reason they 
should not undermine our findings. 
It should be further noted that the period considered, between 2007 and 2012, is 
marked by particularly adverse macroeconomic conditions, with two recessions in 2009 
and (again) in 2011. Therefore, there may be a possible bias resulting from the 
turbulence in Portugal at the time. In the end, it is not possible to entirely remove the 
potential biases macroeconomic and policy changes may introduce, by differently 
affecting the control and treatment groups, for both theoretical and empirical reasons. 
Nonetheless, this challenge was addressed in the study, through the use of several 
alternative comparison and control groups as to attest the robustness of the results. 
6. Conclusion 
 
The mandated benefits model predicts that wages fall after the introduction of 
benefits associated with increased costs for employers. The mechanism is clear: as the 
predicted costs for the employer rise, labor demand will fall, consequently decreasing 
wages. It can thus be said that the cost of those benefits is shifted to workers, through 
lower wages. On the other hand, if workers value the benefit, there will be an increase 
in labor supply, further decreasing wages. 
An increase of parental leave benefits in Portugal, in 2009 gives the setting for the 
experiment. Employing a difference-in-differences methodology and the use of several 
treatment-control pairs, findings display a persistent and statistically significant negative 
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effect on real hourly wages, across different period and group specifications, endorsing 
the theoretical predictions. 
The significant effects found for male employees reflect relevant take-up rates for 
the father-specific benefits that were introduced and support the reasoning of a worker 
who values the benefit, bearing the cost of the mandate. 
Subgroup analysis reinforces these conclusions, as larger effects are displayed for 
the groups more likely to use the benefits, thus representing higher estimated costs for 
the employer, namely groups of workers with more education and in performing higher-
skilled jobs. Factors such as barriers to the adjustment of wages, such as the minimum 
wage, have to be taken into account. Evidence also shows workers with fixed-term 
contracts bear more costs of the mandate, as compared to workers with permanent 
contracts. As the former are not obvious users of the policy, this difference can be 
justified by easier wage adjustment for fixed-term contracts. 
These results must however be carefully interpreted, due to some properties of this 
study: the dataset used does not include information that might eventually be relevant 
such as nationality (not available for all periods), the use of the benefits introduced, the 
civil status of the individuals (relevant as 62% of children born in 2009 were born to 
married parents) and the number and age of children. These elements would provide a 
more efficient delimitation of the treated group. Other possible shortcomings include the 
macroeconomic conditions of the period in study, with two recession periods, along 
with the decreasing fertility rates in Portugal. 
However, as robustness was tested through the use of several different 
specifications in terms of groups and periods, one may safely argue for the existence of 
an effect: a persistent and statistically significant negative impact on wages for the 
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target group, that attests for the capacity of the labor market to adjust to an increase of 
benefits (costs) for the worker (employer) arising from a legislation change.  
It is important to stress that this work focuses on the impact on wages of the 
increase in parental leave benefits in 2009, thus ignoring possible externalities of the 
policy and its long-term effects. As such, these results are not – and do not intend to be 
– a cost-benefit analysis of the policy nor an assessment of its effectiveness. 
There is vast room for additional research on changes (increases) to parental 
benefits in the Portuguese labor market regulation, to which this work aims to provide a 
modest contribution. Issues to be addressed in further studies include: 
 The effects on the hours worked, employment level, likelihood of securing a 
permanent contract; 
 A better identification of the treatment group through the cross gathering of 
missing data, by using different sources together with Quadros de Pessoal; 
 The labor market effects of a 2015 increase in the length of maternity leave; 
 The effects on child health of an increase in benefits – see Ruhm (2000) and 
Berger et al. (2005) for inspiration. 
 
In brief, the results support theoretical considerations, meeting their predictions that 
the increase in benefits was met by a reaction in the labour market, illustrated by the 
impact on wages, hopefully adding to the understanding of the mechanisms for the 
Portuguese case. Regardless of whether this is or not in line with policy objectives – and 
of any fairness considerations – that results also seem to show workers indeed valued 
the benefit can be seen as encouraging further work – to possibly support further policy 
in this field. 
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